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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
A dispute between the Government of the Virgin Islands 
("GVI") and a littoral landowner1  over the boundaries of a 
piece of property in downtown Christiansted, St. Croix, led 
to this quiet title action in the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, which the District Court resolved by granting 
summary judgment to the plaintiff, Club Comanche, Inc. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "A littoral landowner is one whose land borders an ocean, sea, or 
lake." Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 757 
F.2d 
534, 538 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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The threshold question in this appeal is whether the 
District Court had (or lacked) subject matter jurisdiction. 
Applying the "well-pleaded complaint rule," we conclude 
that none of the asserted bases for jurisdiction in the 
District Court rather than the Territorial Court of the Virgin 
Islands -- i.e., the 1916 treaty by which Denmark 
transferred the Virgin Islands to the United States and the 
federal statutes by which the United States transferred 
public lands and submerged and reclaimed lands to the 
GVI in 1974 -- is sufficient to support federal question 
jurisdiction in a quiet title action brought pursuant to the 
Virgin Islands quiet title statute, 28 V.I.C. S 372. We will 
therefore vacate the District Court's order and remand with 
instructions to dismiss the suit without prejudice. 
 
I. Facts & Procedural History 
 
The case involves the disputed boundaries of the property 
at 40 Strand Street, which is located in the town of 
Christiansted. Club Comanche, Inc., the current owner of 
40 Strand Street, operates a hotel and restaurant on the 
property. The case arises from the GVI's attempt to build a 
pedestrian boardwalk along Christiansted Harbor. 
According to Club Comanche, the GVI told the littoral 
landowners in Christiansted that it could not afford to 
exercise eminent domain and pay for the land necessary to 
build the boardwalk. Believing that the boardwalk would be 
beneficial to their businesses, the littoral landowners, 
including Club Comanche, agreed to grant a "perpetual 
easement" to the government for the boardwalk. The GVI 
originally agreed to this arrangement but, in Club 
Comanche's submission, subsequently claimed that the 
coastline of lot 40 actually does not belong to Club 
Comanche but rather to the GVI in trust for the people of 
the Virgin Islands. The GVI drew a new map of the area 
around lot 40 Strand Street, designating the northern 
coastal portion of the lot as "lot 40A Strand Street," and 
claimed ownership of the renamed parcel. In response, 
Club Comanche filed this quiet title action in the District 
Court. 
 
Lot 40 Strand Street is a roughly rectangular piece of 
property that fronts Strand Street on its southern edge. The 
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lot is bordered on its western edge by lot 39 Strand Street. 
The northern and eastern borders of the property are in 
dispute. Club Comanche contends that its property extends 
northward all the way to Christiansted Harbor. The GVI 
submits that Club Comanche's lot does not extend all the 
way to the water, and that the coastal area north of lot 40, 
which it has designated lot 40A, belongs to the GVI. 2 This 
dispute turns largely on the proper translation of the first 
document recording the dimensions of lot 40 Strand Street, 
the so-called Danish Measure Brief. The dimensions from 
the original Danish Measure Brief have appeared on the 
deeds to that property since 1803 (first in Danish, and later 
in English). 
 
The deed by which the previous owner of 40 Strand 
Street conveyed the property to Club Comanche recites the 
following interpretation of the language from the original 
Danish Measure Brief: 
 
       MEASURE BRIEF 
 
       FOR THE PROPERTY NO. 40 Strand Street, in the 
       Town of Christiansted, on the Island of St. Croix, V.I.[,] 
       U.S.A. 
 
        THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the above mentioned lot 
       according to the Surveyor's Records has the following 
       boundaries: 
 
       to the north 63 feet towards the sea 
       to the south 61 feet towards Strand Street 
       to the East 215 feet towards 55 King Street 
       to the West 215 feet towards 39 Strand Street 
 
This area is about DANISH MEASURE square feet.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. On the eastern edge of the property, Club Comanche maintains that 
its lot is bordered by the lot at 55 King Street, while the GVI contends 
that it has always owned a corridor of land along the eastern edge of the 
property that could accommodate the extension of Strand Lane (which is 
perpendicular to Strand Street) northward to the harbor. 
 
3. Danish feet are slightly longer than English feet. A length of 215 
Danish feet is roughly equal to 221.5 English feet. The dimensions that 
we cite in this opinion are in Danish feet. 
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Club Comanche offered testimony from its surveyor, who 
contacted the main Cadastral (property records) Office in 
Denmark, which keeps historical property records from St. 
Croix, stating that the Danish word "til," which the above 
passage translates as "towards," should actually be 
translated as "along" or "against." This would make the 
proper translation of the Measure Brief, "63 feet along the 
sea," "61 feet along Strand Street," and so on.4 Under this 
translation, Club Comanche would be a littoral landowner. 
 
The GVI presented an affidavit from a translator that 
stated that the proper translation of the dimensions recited 
in the Danish Measure Brief is as follows: 
 
       Facing North 63' toward the Sea 
       [Facing] South 61' toward Strand Street 
       [Facing] East 215' toward 55 King's Street 
       [Facing] West 215' toward 39 Strand Street 
 
The translator translated the word "facing" from the Danish 
word "mod," which begins the first line of the original 
Danish Measure Brief. According to the translator's 
affidavit, "[t]he word `mod' is a shortened form of the 
Danish expression `med front mod,' meaning `facing' in 
English." The word "mod" does not precede the next three 
lines, but the translator inferred from its placement that it 
applied to all four. The translator also offered a longer 
interpretation of the meaning of the abbreviated phrases 
used on the Measure Brief, opining that: 
 
       [T]he intention of the description is to explain the size 
       of the piece of land and where it is located. Thus, in 
       reality what is being stated is: 
 
       The property line facing the north side toward the sea 
       is 63 feet long. 
 
       The property line facing the south side toward Strand 
       Street is 61 feet long. 
 
       The property line facing the east side toward 55 King's 
       Street is 215 feet long. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Club Comanche also submitted an affidavit from a Danish translator 
that interpreted the word "til" in the Measure Brief to mean "to." 
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       The property line facing the west side toward 39 Strand 
       Street is 215 feet long. 
 
       Thus, in order to understand how far 40 Strand Street 
       extends towards the sea, it is necessary to look at the 
       east and west property lines. According to the 
       surveyor's description, the property extends 215' 
       (Danish measure) from Strand Street in the direction of 
       the sea, that is, northward. 
 
Under this interpretation, given the dimensions of the 
disputed lot, Club Comanche would not be a littoral 
landowner with any claim to the area traversed by the 
boardwalk. 
 
Basing its argument on the contention that the original 
Danish Measure Brief defined the property as running 
"along the sea," or northward "to the sea," Club Comanche 
reasoned that the rule of construction stated in 28 V.I.C. 
S 47(2) should apply. That section states: 
 
       When permanent and visible or ascertained boundaries 
       or monuments are inconsistent with the measurement 
       either of lines, angles, or surfaces, the boundaries or 
       monuments are paramount. 
 
28 V.I.C. S 47(2) (1996). Club Comanche argued that 
because the boundary defined by reference to the sea was 
inconsistent with the actual distance between Strand Street 
and the sea, the court should, pursuant to 28 V.I.C. 
S 47(2), declare that the sea is the actual northern 
boundary of lot 40. The GVI, in contrast, contended that 
the translation that it offered means that lot 40 Strand 
Street extends northward only 215 feet from Strand Street, 
leaving a strip of coastline between the northern boundary 
of the lot and Christiansted Harbor, which it asserts 
belongs to the GVI. 
 
Following discovery, Club Comanche moved for summary 
judgment. The GVI filed a brief in opposition to the motion 
and a cross-motion for summary judgment. Club 
Comanche then moved for a temporary restraining order 
(TRO) and preliminary injunction against the construction 
of the boardwalk. Following a hearing, the District Court 
granted the TRO, ordering the GVI to cease exercising 
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dominion over lot 40A, with the proviso that the GVI could 
continue to build the boardwalk subject to the 
understanding that it would be required to remove any of 
the boardwalk it constructed on lot 40A if that portion of 
the lot was later determined to belong to Club Comanche. 
 
The parties filed a stipulation waiving a hearing on the 
request for a preliminary injunction and the summary 
judgment motions. Thereafter, Club Comanche moved to 
amend its complaint to request a declaration clarifying title 
to the disputed area on the eastern side of the property (the 
Strand Lane extension), see supra note 2, which the 
District Court granted. Club Comanche then filed an 
amended complaint that included a prayer for declaratory 
judgment on the disputed eastern edge of the property, 
which the GVI answered. 
 
On February 22, 2001, the District Court entered an 
order granting Club Comanche's motion for summary 
judgment, and denying the GVI's cross-motion without an 
accompanying opinion. Judging from the language in the 
order, it appears that the District Court accepted Club 
Comanche's translation of the Danish Measure Brief and 
applied the presumption from 28 V.I.C. S 47(2), concluding 
that "[u]pon consideration of the evidence presented to the 
Court, the Court now finds [that][a]s proven by the 
testimony of Marshall Walker, surveyor, . . . Plot 40 . . . 
was originally intended to `run to the sea' and include Plot 
40A." (emphasis added). Although it did not discuss the 
legal issues involved in the dispute regarding the eastern 
edge of the property, the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment also disposed of that issue. The GVI now appeals 
the District Court's order granting summary judgment to 
Club Comanche. 
 
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction  
 
A. Background -- Contentions of the Parties  
 
Although neither party challenges the District Court's 
subject matter jurisdiction (or raised the issue in the 
District Court), we are obligated to address questions of 
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jurisdiction sua sponte. See Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul 
Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
We have detailed the jurisdictional history of the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands in Callwood v. Enos , 230 F.3d 
627 (3d Cir. 2000), and Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027 (3d 
Cir. 1993), so we will provide only a summary version here. 
The Revised Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. SS 1541-1645 (West 
1987 & Supp. 2001), which Congress enacted pursuant to 
its power under Article IV, S 3 of the U.S. Constitution, 
establishes the jurisdiction of the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands.5 Before 1984, the Revised Organic Act vested 
broad jurisdiction in the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, including jurisdiction over "all causes arising 
under the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United 
States," Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558 S 22, 68 Stat. 497, as 
well as "general original jurisdiction over all other matters 
in the Virgin Islands, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the local courts over civil actions in which the amount in 
controversy was less than $500 and over criminal actions 
for local offenses in which the maximum punishment did 
not exceed six months in prison or a $100 fine." Callwood, 
230 F.3d at 630. The result of this broad grant of 
jurisdiction was that the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
was "more like a state court of general jurisdiction than a 
United States district court." Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
679 F.2d 1051, 1057 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 
In 1984, Congress rewrote the section of the Revised 
Organic Act that defines the jurisdiction of the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands. The new jurisdictional provision 
effected two changes. First, the Act provided that,"[t]he 
District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have the 
jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States, 
including, but not limited to, the diversity jurisdiction 
provided for in section 1332 of Title 28, and that of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Article IV, S 3 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to make 
"all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States." U.S. Const. art. IV, S 3, cl. 2. 
Pursuant to this power, Congress enacted the Revised Organic Act, 
which serves as the Virgin Islands constitution. See Parrott v. Gov't of 
the 
Virgin Islands, 230 F.3d 615, 623 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
                                8 
  
bankruptcy court of the United States." 48 U.S.C.S 1612(a). 
As we noted in Walker v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 
230 F.3d 82 (3d Cir. 2000), this provision "affirmatively 
bestows on the District Court of the Virgin Islands the 
entire jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States 
. . . ." Id. at 86. Second, the Act provided that "the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands shall have general original 
jurisdiction in all causes in the Virgin Islands the 
jurisdiction over which is not then vested by local law in 
the local courts of the Virgin Islands . . . ." 48 U.S.C. 
S 1612(b). Most importantly, however, in this section, 
"Congress gave the Virgin Islands legislature the power to 
vest jurisdiction over local actions exclusively in the local 
courts." Callwood, 230 F.3d at 631; see also Estate Thomas 
Mall, Inc. v. Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, 923 F.2d 
258, 261 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
The Virgin Islands legislature exercised this power in 
1990, by enacting the following statutory section, which 
provides in relevant part: 
 
       Subject to the original jurisdiction conferred on the 
       District Court by section 22 of the Revised Organic Act 
       of 1954, as amended, effective October 1, 1991, the 
       Territorial Court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
       civil actions regardless of the amount in controversy 
       . . . . 
 
4 V.I.C. S 76(a) (1997). In Brow we explained that "this 
section divests the District Court of the Virgin Islands of 
jurisdiction of all local civil actions, but does not divest the 
District Court of its federal question and diversity 
jurisdiction in civil actions, as evidenced by the provisional 
language at the beginning of the statute." 994 F.2d at 1034; 
see also 4 V.I.C. S 76(b) (1997) (vesting original jurisdiction 
over all local criminal actions in the Territorial Court). 
 
Therefore, the question in this case is whether the 
District Court had jurisdiction to hear this dispute under 
48 U.S.C. S 1612(a), which gives the District of the Virgin 
Islands jurisdiction that is equivalent, at least in the civil 
context, to that of a United States District Court. 6 Because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Cf. Callwood, 230 F.3d at 631 (noting that "under S 22 of the Revised 
Organic Act, [48 U.S.C. S 1612(c),] the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands 
retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Territorial Court over criminal 
actions in which the local crimes charged are related to federal crimes"). 
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the parties are not diverse, the only possible source of 
jurisdiction is federal question jurisdiction, which the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands has pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1331 and 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a). We asked for 
supplemental briefs on the source of federal question 
jurisdiction in this case. Both parties agreed that this case 
is an action to quiet title. Club Comanche concedes that 
normally, such quiet title actions belong in the Territorial 
Court, and not the District Court. However, both parties 
contend that there are federal elements to the claim that 
are sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction. 
 
They point primarily to the Convention Between the 
United States and Denmark, 39 Stat. 1706 (signed Aug. 4, 
1916; ratified Jan. 16, 1917) (reprinted in Title 1 V.I. Code 
Ann. at 27), by which the United States purchased from 
Denmark all of the state-owned lands in the islands of St. 
Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John. They argue that the 
resolution of this quiet title action requires the court to 
interpret this treaty, thus providing the basis for federal 
question jurisdiction. 
 
The GVI also points to three other purported sources of 
federal question jurisdiction. First, the GVI cites the two 
federal statutes by which the United States turned over 
submerged and public lands to the GVI: 48 U.S.C.SS 1705- 
08 (conveying to the GVI all submerged and formerly 
submerged lands), and 48 U.S.C. SS 1545(b)(1) and (2) 
(turning over to the GVI all public lands held by the United 
States except those expressly reserved by the U.S. 
Department of the Interior). The GVI also cites the federal 
common law as a source of federal jurisdiction, which it 
correctly contends is the law that governs questions of 
shoreline filling and accretion that occurred prior to 1974, 
when the United States conveyed submerged lands in the 
U.S. Virgin Islands to the GVI. See Alexander Hamilton Life 
Ins., 757 F.2d at 538 n.6.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The federal common law of submerged lands is arguably relevant to 
this case because one of the alternative arguments that the GVI presents 
is that the coastal lot that it now designates lot 40A was originally 
submerged land that the owners of lot 40 have reclaimed from the sea 
through a process of artificial filling, primarily during the eighteenth 
and 
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B. Significance of the Virgin Islands Quiet Title 
Statute  
 
Preliminarily we must dispose of the question whether 
the fact that the Virgin Islands quiet title statute, 28 V.I.C. 
S 372, which, when it was enacted in 1921, specifically 
vested jurisdiction in the "district court," exempts quiet title 
actions from 4 V.I.C. S 76(a)'s vesting of"original 
jurisdiction in all civil actions" in the Territorial Courts. If 
so, the District Court of the Virgin Islands would still have 
jurisdiction over quiet title actions brought under 28 V.I.C. 
S 372 pursuant to 48 U.S.C. S 1612(b). While Club 
Comanche did not specifically cite S 372 as the basis for its 
quiet title claim in this case, it acknowledges that its claim 
is a quiet title claim. The parties do not cite and we cannot 
find any statute other than 28 V.I.C. S 372 that could 
support Comanche's quiet title action. Therefore, we 
assume that Comanche has brought its claim pursuant to 
that statute. 
 
The Virgin Islands Code section governing quiet title 
actions, titled "Action to determine boundaries," provides as 
follows: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
nineteenth centuries. We held in Alexander Hamilton Life Insurance that 
the federal common law applied to a dispute over littoral property in the 
Virgin Islands where the purported filling and/or extension of the 
property into the sea through natural accretion took place prior to 1974, 
when the GVI obtained title over submerged lands, (although we did not 
decide whether the federal common law applies to filling or accretion 
that took place prior to 1917, when the United States obtained from 
Denmark title to the submerged lands surrounding St. Croix, St. 
Thomas, and St. John). 757 F.2d at 538 n.6. Under federal common law, 
if a littoral landowner's property is extended through the natural process 
of accretion, then the reclaimed coastal land (also known as "fastlands") 
"accrue to the owner of the adjoining uplands, because this owner 
should not be deprived of his access to the sea, which is a major factor 
in the value of his property, by slow and imperceptible acts of nature." 
Id. at 538. However, "[t]itle to fastlands . . . resulting from 
unauthorized 
artificial fill remains with the owner of the submerged lands." Id. at 
539. 
 
We do not reach the question whether the federal common law of 
submerged lands governs this dispute because even assuming that it 
does, the plaintiff did not need to reference the federal common law in 
its quiet title complaint, and thus it cannot be the basis for federal 
question jurisdiction in this case. See infra  Section II.C. 
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       In any case where any dispute or controversy exists, or 
       may hereafter arise, between two or more owners of 
       adjacent or contiguous lands in the Virgin Islands, 
       concerning the boundary lines thereof, or the location 
       of the lines dividing such lands, either party or any 
       party to such dispute or controversy may bring and 
       maintain an action of an equitable nature in the district 
       court for the purpose of having such controversy or 
       dispute determined . . . . 
 
28 V.I.C. S 372 (1997) (emphasis added). Thus, the question 
arises whether S 76(a)'s general grant of original jurisdiction 
to the Territorial Courts in all civil actions has impliedly 
repealed the part of 28 V.I.C. S 372 that earlier expressly 
stated that quiet title actions should be brought"in the 
district court." On one hand, the language ofS 76(a) is 
broad and does not specify any exceptions. It 
unambiguously states that "the Territorial Court shall have 
original jurisdiction in all civil actions regardless of the 
amount in controversy." S 76(a). And we have held that 
S 76(a) has divested the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
of jurisdiction over "all local civil actions." Brow, 994 F.2d 
at 1034. On the other hand, to interpret S 76(a) to cover the 
quiet title action established in S 372 would go against the 
canon of statutory construction that "[i]mplied repeals are 
not favored, and if effect can reasonably be given to both 
statutes the presumption is that the earlier is intended to 
remain in force." United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 88 
(1971) (quoting United States v. Burroughs, 289 U.S. 159, 
164 (1933)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
While we recognize that these two statutes are in some 
tension, we are satisfied that S 76(a)'s language vesting 
original jurisdiction in the Territorial Courts in"all civil 
actions" includes quiet title actions, notwithstanding the 
language from S 372 about bringing a quiet title action "in 
the district court."8 ReadingS 76(a) to divest the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In Newfound Mgmt. Corp. v. Lewis, 131 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1997), we 
noted that jurisdiction over quiet title cases "resides in the territorial 
court" for cases filed after the effective date of S 76(a). We did not 
discuss 
the issue, however, because the case before us had been filed before the 
effective date of S 76(a) and thus the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands 
had jurisdiction notwithstanding the later vesting of such actions in the 
Territorial Courts. Id. at 119 n.9. We take this opportunity to address 
more fully why S 76(a) vests original jurisdiction over quiet title 
actions 
brought pursuant to 28 V.I.C. S 372 in the Territorial Courts. 
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Court of the Virgin Islands of jurisdiction overS 372 quiet 
title actions does not actually impliedly repeal any operative 
part of S 372. The only part that it arguably repeals is 
S 372's statement that "either party or any party to such 
dispute or controversy may bring and maintain an action of 
an equitable nature in the district court . . . ." 28 V.I.C. 
S 372 (emphasis added). The rest of the statute -- the part 
that creates the cause of action -- remains. The part that 
purports to vest jurisdiction in the district court, however, 
was both inoperative (because only Congress may vest 
jurisdiction in the District Court of the Virgin Islands) and 
unnecessary (because Congress had already vested broad 
jurisdiction in the District Court of the Virgin Islands) in 
the first place. See Estate Thomas Mall, Inc. , 923 F.2d at 261.9 
 
C. Reasons for the Absence of Federal Question 
Jurisdiction 
 
The most straightforward test of whether an action 
presents a federal question is to determine the law from 
which the cause of action arises, federal or otherwise. 
Justice Holmes's formulation of this test was that"[a] suit 
arises under the law that creates the cause of action." Am. 
Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 
(1916). The parties in this case both concede that it is a 
quiet title action. The only potential source of law for such 
an action is 28 V.I.C. S 372, the Virgin Islands statute 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We also note that the Territorial Court has interpreted S 76(a) as 
"rendering null and void" a provision of the Virgin Islands Code that 
contains language similar to S 372's language that purports to vest 
jurisdiction "in the district court." In In re Application of Moorhead, 27 
V.I. 74 (Terr. Ct. 1992), the Territorial Court considered the effect of 
S 76(a) on 4 V.I.C. S 441. Section 441 provides that "[t]he district court 
has jurisdiction over the admission of attorneys at law to practice in the 
courts of the Territory and over the discipline of persons so admitted and 
may make rules and regulations governing the practice of law in the 
Territory." S 441(a). Finding the language of S 76(a) to be "clear and 
unequivocal" in its intent to "include[ ] all civil actions cognizable in 
local 
courts," the Territorial Court found that when the Virgin Islands 
legislature enacted S 76(a), "the District Court was then divested of such 
jurisdiction, and the prior local law, 4 V.I.C. Sec. 441, being 
inconsistent 
with [S 76(a)], was rendered null and void." Moorhead, 27 V.I. at 82, 84. 
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titled, "Action to determine boundaries." See supra at 
11-12. 
 
If, as here, the cause of action is created by state or 
territorial law rather than federal law, the claim may still 
present a federal question. In these circumstances,"[t]he 
presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is 
governed by the `well-pleaded complaint rule,' which 
provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal 
question is presented on the face of the plaintiff 's properly 
pleaded complaint." Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 
470, 475 (1998) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 
U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A 
plaintiff 's lack of reference, or erroneous reference to 
federal law is not controlling. See N. Am. Phillips Corp. v. 
Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1978). 
Common-law pleading requirements originally provided the 
benchmark for determining whether a federal element must 
be raised to support a "well-pleaded" complaint. See Wright 
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure,S 3566 at 83 (1984) 
(noting that in early cases, the Supreme Court "cit[ed] 
Chitty [on Pleadings] to determine what allegations are 
proper"). 
 
Modern cases, however, look to the pleading 
requirements established in the statutes from which the 
causes of action arise, or in courts' interpretations of the 
pleading requirements of those statutes. See, e.g., Yokeno v. 
Mafnas, 973 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hodges 
Transp., Inc. v. Nevada, 562 F. Supp. 521, 522 (D. Nev. 
1983), which in turn relied on the Nevada Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the pleading requirements in quiet title 
actions for the purpose of the well-pleaded complaint rule). 
The Virgin Islands legislature has helpfully specified what is 
necessary for a properly pleaded complaint brought under 
28 V.I.C. S 372: 
 
       The complaint in an action to determine boundaries 
       shall be sufficient if it appears therefrom that the 
       plaintiff and defendant or defendants are owners of 
       adjacent lands and that there is a controversy or 
       dispute between the parties concerning their boundary 
       or dividing line or lines. It shall not be necessary to set 
       forth the nature of such dispute or controversy further 
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       than that the plaintiff shall describe the boundary or 
       dividing line as he claims it to be. The defendant, in his 
       answer, shall set forth the nature of his claim with 
       reference to the location of the lines in the controversy. 
 
28 V.I.C. S 373 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 
Club Comanche could have filed a well-pleaded S 372 
complaint in this action simply by stating the boundaries of 
the property that it claimed. Thus, in this case, the federal 
issues of interpreting the Convention Between the United 
States and Denmark, interpreting the federal statutes that 
transferred submerged and public lands from the United 
States to the GVI, and applying the federal common law of 
submerged lands, did not need to be raised in Club 
Comanche's well-pleaded quiet title complaint. Therefore, 
applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, Club Comanche's 
quiet title action does not contain a federal question 
sufficient to support jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1331 
and 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a). 
 
Other federal courts that have considered the question 
whether quiet title actions in which the defendant's claim to 
the land was based on federal law have also concluded that 
they do not qualify for federal question jurisdiction under 
the well-pleaded complaint rule. See American Invs-Co 
Countryside, Inc. v. Riverdale Bank, 596 F.2d 211, 217 n.10 
(7th Cir. 1979) ("If title to land is in doubt because of some 
matter of federal law, there is federal jurisdiction to 
entertain a bill to remove a cloud on title but not a suit to 
quiet title, since allegations as to the nature of the cloud 
are proper in the first kind of action but improper in the 
second."); see also Friend v. Kreger, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6764, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 1998) (finding that the state 
law quiet title action before the court did not present a 
federal question under the well-pleaded complaint rule); 
accord 14 ALR.2d 992, 1125 (1950) ("[I]t is difficult, at least 
in the ordinary type of case, to plead a Federal question 
substantial in nature which is an essential element of 
plaintiff 's quiet title action . . . ."). This analysis accords 
with common jurisprudential notions of the incidents of 
"arising under" jurisdiction. The mere fact that a source of 
law, such as the treaty involved here, is consulted in 
deciding an issue, does not create jurisdiction. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Club Comanche's 
quiet title claim does not "arise under" the laws or treaties 
of the United States within the meaning of section 1331, 
and therefore that the District Court did not have 
jurisdiction over this dispute under 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a).10 
We will therefore vacate the District Court's summary 
judgment order and remand the case with instructions for 
the District Court to dismiss it without prejudice so that it 
may be refiled in the Territorial Court.11  Dismissal without 
prejudice should not present a problem for Club Comanche 
because there appears to be a twenty-year statute of 
limitations on quiet title actions. See 5 V.I.C. S 32(b) (1997) 
("An action for the determination of any right or claim to or 
interest in real property shall be deemed within the 
limitations provided for actions for the recovery of the 
possession of real property."); S 31(1)(A) (actions for the 
recovery of the possession of real property are subject to a 
twenty-year statute of limitations). We note in this regard 
that the District Court does not have the authority to 
transfer the case to the Territorial Court. See Moravian Sch. 
Advisory Bd. v. Rawlins, 70 F.3d 270, 274 (3d Cir. 1995). 
10. Although Club Comanche cited in its complaint the "takings" clause 
of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (which applies to the 
U.S. Virgin Islands pursuant to the Revised Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. 
S 1561), it never requested relief in the form of "just compensation," 
never argued the "takings" issue before the District Court, and has not 
argued before this court that the "takings" clause serves as the basis for 
federal question jurisdiction. Moreover, Club Comanche suffered neither 
a permanent physical occupation of its property nor a destruction of the 
value of its property through regulation, the actions that we generally 
recognize as bases of a claim for just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 
11. We assume that the matter may be resolved expeditiously by the 
Territorial Court because the District Court has already developed a 
record. We trust, however, that the Territorial Court will consider the 
need to make findings of fact at the appropriate stage in the case. While 
the District Court disposed of the case on summary judgment, it appears 
to have made findings of fact on the issue of the proper translation of 
the 
Danish Measure Brief which, of course, is not permitted at the summary 
judgment stage. 
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